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ON TOTAL PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
AND THE BEHAVIOR OF A COMPETITIVE FIRM
by Bahram Adrangi* and Kambiz Raffiee**
Abstract
In this paper, a general m odel o f  the com p etitive  firm ’s behavior under output and factor (total) price  
uncertainty is d evelop ed  to evaluate the role o f  market interdependencies in analyzing long-run eq u ilib ­
rium con d ition s and com parative statics analysis o f  increased uncertainty in output and input prices. It 
is dem onstrated that the results show n in the literature are a specia l case o f  the find ings reported here 
and market interdependencies play a central role in determ ining the firm ’s long-run equilibrium  under 
uncertainty.
I. Introduction
It is just over a quarter of a century since the 
publication of the seminal paper by Sandmo [1971] 
that formally introduced a systematic formulation 
of the competitive firm’s behavior under output 
price uncertainty. The theory of the firm under 
uncertainty has been researched significantly since 
Sandmo [1971] by examining the firm’s operations 
under various sources of uncertainty in the firm’s 
operations: output price uncertainty, factor price 
uncertainty, and total (output and factor) price 
uncertainty. The studies by Chavas and Pope 
[1985], Demers and Demers [1990], Hartman 
[1976], Horbulyk [1993], Paris [1989], Pope 
[1980], and Sandmo [1971] have examined the 
impact of output price uncertainty; Ormiston and 
Schlee [1994], the impact of factor cost uncertain­
ty; Booth [1983] and Paris [1988], the impact of 
total price uncertainty.
These contributions have invariably assumed 
that the firm’s objective is to maximize the share­
holder’s expected utility function under a given 
source of price uncertainty and report the compara­
tive statics analysis for a mean-preserving increase 
in either output price or factor cost uncertainty. 
None of these studies evaluate the role of market
interdependencies in determining a firm’s long-run 
equilibrium conditions under uncertainty . 1
The present paper will examine the effect of total 
price uncertainty on the firm’s long-run equilibrium 
where the probability distributions of output and 
factor prices are not independent. The role of mar­
ket interdependencies to achieve the firm’s equilib­
rium and the effect of changes in uncertainty on its 
optimum use of inputs is presented.
The next section describes the basic model of the 
firm under total price uncertainty and presents the 
requirements to achieve the long-run competitive 
equilibrium. Comparative statics results of 
increased uncertainty in output and input prices are 
derived in Section HI. A brief summary is present­
ed in the final section. The firm ’s equilibrium under 
risk neutrality is discussed in the Appendix.
II. The Model
The model explains the firm’s long-run behavior 
which it chooses optimal capital ( K) and labor (L) to 
maximize the shareholder’s expected utility func­
tion. Let t/(u ) be the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function of the firm with the property that 
U'(tt) > 0 and U"(it) < 0 for firms that are risk 
averse. 2 Hence, the firm’s decision problem is to
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K,L
E\U(tt = pQ -  r K -  wL)]. ( 1)
where it is profit, Q is output, p, r, and w are the 
uncertain product price, cost of capital, and wage 
rate, respectively, representing stochastic random 
variables with the joint probability distribution 
function m(p,r,w) defined for p, r, w > 0  with finite 
moments. The respective expected values for p, r, 
and w are |xp, | j l  and |xw.
The assumptions of an interior solution of the 
firm’s equilibrium to exist are that the firm’s pro­
duction function Q = Q(K, L) is assumed to be 
strictly concave with factor marginal products 
strictly positive and increasing at a deceasing rate,
i.e., Ql > 0, Qk > 0, Qu < 0, and g KK < 0. Let 
E[U(tt)] =  h(K,L). Then, the first-order conditions 
for optimization of ( 1 ) are ’
dE[L/(tt)]
hK = dK = ^ X p G k  -  r)] = 0 , (2 )
h, =
dE[U( ir)J
: £ [ t / '( 7T)(Pa  -  w)] = 0. (3)
Expanding the expectation operator in (2) and (3) 
gives
cov[U'{,u),r] cov[U'{ Tr),p]
M-r E[[Z'(tt)] Q' ,(4)
_ CO\’[U'( TT),W] C‘OV’[i//('77),p]
~ = EH/'Ctt)] -  Gl E[U'(tt)\ ■ (5)
The firm’s equilibrium under uncertainty in (4) 
and (5) depends on the sign of the covariance terms, 
cov[l/'('ir),r], cov[£/'(tt),w], and cov[U'(ir),p]. It 
will be shown below that the signs and the firm’s 
equilibrium under uncertainty depend on: (i) the 
relationship between the output and factor markets 
as determined by the properties of the joint proba­
bility distribution function of prices and (ii) the 
firm’s attitude toward risk. Market interdependen­
cies have been ignored by the previous studies 
which focused only on the firm ’s attitude toward 
risk. In this paper, market interdependencies are 
accounted for by examining the joint probability 
distribution function of wages, capital costs, and 
output prices.
Let k(p,w|r) = ~n where k(p,w|r) is the
joint conditional probability density function of p 
and w given r, g(r) is the non-zero marginal proba­
bility density function of r, with in(p,r,w) as defined 
before. Additionally, let E\U’(tt)] = If. Then the 
covariance term cov[t/'(iT),r|, in (4), can be written 
as
cov[U \Ti),rl = J J J t t W  -  U'] x
P *  r (6)
(r -jjir)k(p,wjr)g(r)dpdwdr,
or
cov[U'{TT),rl = JlfltA TO lrl -  0 '] ( r -  |x)g(r)dr. (7) 
where E[f/'(ir)|r] = JJ'L,/(TT)k(p,w|r)dpdw.4
p w
Since E[U'{r -  |x)] = £ [ t/ ,(Tr)||Xr]£(r -  |xr) = 0, then 
(7) can be written as
cov[U'{Tr),r] = j* [Z?[t/'(-Tr)|r] 
£[{/'(Tr)||xrJ J (r-  |xr)g(r)dr.
( 8)
The sign of cov[U'(iT),r] in (8 ) depends on the sign 
of the terms on the right-hand-side integral of the 
equation because (r -  |x ) is an increasing function 
of r. But
a [E [tA T r) |r ]-£ [ t/T ir)k l]  =
dr
, (9)
J|L -K U "(tt) + | ^  x *£pl)]k(p,w|r)dpdw.
P w
where k = k(p,w|r). Using the result in (9), the sign 
of the covariance term in (8 ) can now be determined
as
sign[covlt/'(TT),r]] =
■ i t i t " /  > d k  U ' ( tt)sign -K U  (it) + — x —r— 
6 dr k ( 10)
Similarly, the sign of the remaining covariance 
terms in (4) and (5) can be shown to be determined 
as
sign[cov[f/'(Tr),w]] =
. I , , . df U'(tt)
s,gn[-LU  + T
( 11)
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sign[cov[f/'(ir),p]]
sign e U "W  + * x ? ^^  v dp e
(12)
cov[U'{Tt),t\ > 0, 
CO VI £ / ( t t ) , w ]  >  0, 
cov[l7'(ir),p] < 0 .
(13)
(14)
(15)
Using the results in (13)—(15) and in (4) and (5), 
one gets the well-established condition in the liter­
ature that the long-run equilibrium of a risk averse 
competitive firm is
(16)
(17)
In other words, under the special case that the 
markets are independent, the firm’s attitude toward 
risk is sufficient to achieve the long-run equilib­
rium.
However, if markets are not independent, i.e..
dk(p,w|r) df(p,r[w) 
dr ' dw +  0 , and
de(r,w[p)_ _ _
run equilibrium of a risk averse competitive firm 
from (4) and (5) is
where f  = f(p,r|w) and e = e(r,w|p) are the respective 
joint conditional probability density functions of p 
and r given w and r and w given p, defined for the 
non-zero marginal density functions of w and p,t(w)
and n(p), as f(p,r|w) = and e(r,w|p) =
m(p.r,w) 
n(p) '
The assumption that markets are independent
■ r  , dk(p,w|r) df(p,r|w) „ ,implies that —^ — L- = 0 , — J— = 0 , and
d ( \ )———!2-= 0. Clearly, these partial derivatives can
be equal to zero if  and only if m (p,r,w ) = 
n(p)g(r)t(w), that is the output and factor markets 
are independent.’ In the special case, when the out­
put and factor markets are independent, and under 
the assumption that firms are risk averse, the sign of 
the covariance terms in ( 1 0 )—( 1 2 ) can be deter­
mined unambiguously as
VpQk -  Hr *  0 , 
HpGl -  K  *  0 .
(18)
(19)
Let the optimum capital and labor levels 
employed by the firm in (16)—(17) and in (18)—(19) 
be (K \L A) and (K“, LB), respectively. Clearly, once 
market interdependencies are taken into considera­
tion, KA #  KB and LA +  LB. Whether the input lev­
els in (18) and (19) are greater than or less than the 
input levels in (16) and (17) depends on interde­
pendencies among output and factor markets that 
determine the sign of covariance terms in ( 1 0 )—( 1 2 ) 
and the resulting equilibrium in (18) and (19).
One can develop scenarios on the structure of 
interrelationship among markets to examine the 
behavior of the firm under uncertainty. Consider the
df(p,r|w) 
dw
possibility that dk(p>wlr) > 0 ,
dr 0 ,
and defr,wIP) < o. For risk averse firms, one can 
dp
then get unambiguous sign on the covariance terms 
in ( 1 0 )—( 1 2 ) resulting in the long-run equilibrium 
conditions of a risk averse competitive firm are 
identical to those reported in (16) and (17). This 
amounts to the conclusion that under uncertainty 
equilibrium and market interdependencies, the opti­
mal input levels of capital and labor for a risk 
averse firm would be lower than in certainty equi­
librium.
Additionally, the optimum input levels (KB and 
LB) under the special case of interdependent mar­
kets, where 0 , ,  0 , anddr dw
< 0 , can be compared with the optimum
then the firm’s attitude toward risk is necessary but 
not sufficient to have an unambiguous sign on the 
covariance terms in ( 10 )—( 1 2 ) and determination of 
equilibrium under uncertainty in (4) and (5) . 6 If out­
put and input markets are interdependent, the long-
de(r,w|p) 
dp
input levels (KA and LA) under independent markets 
for a risk averse firm. The results are that the firm 
employs more of both inputs if markets are interde­
pendent: K1* < KA and LB < L \  Hence, the interrela­
tionship among markets, established by the condi­
tional probability density functions of output and 
factor markets, is an important determinant of the 
competitive firm’s long-run equilibrium.
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III. Comparative Statics7
The role of market interdependencies in deriving 
the comparative statics results, related with changes 
in the probability distributions of output and input 
prices, of a competitive firm is presented in this sec­
tion. The effects of a marginal increase in price 
uncertainty are defined by the increased variability 
of the output and input price density functions in 
terms of a mean preserving spread. Let us define
P* = 7 p + 0 (20)
dc0v[f/"(Tr),p]
By Q ,
(30)
where ^  = p, /,'[U '(tt) | + cov[U '(Tr),p].
The partial derivative of the covariance terms in 
(29) and (30) with respect to 7  is
dc0v[(7('T r),w ] _  J J
By
U p t \ ) e (r -  a  )K
(w f(p,r|w)dpdr,
(31)
r* = ^r + 0 V
w* = 7 W + 0 ,.
(21)
(22)
where 0 . and 7  are the shift parameters which ini­
tially equal zero and one, respectively. Then a mean 
preserving spread for this type of shift in the densi­
ty functions of P*, r*, and w* leaves their means 
unchanged, that is
dE(P*) = dE(7 P + 6 ,) = |x d-y + d0, = 0, (23)
dE(r*) = dE(7 r + 0„) = |xd7  + d0, = 0, (24)
dE(w*) = dE(7 w + 0t) = (xwd7  + d0, = 0. (25) 
Then (23)-(25) imply 
d0.
d 7  ^  
d0 , 
d 7
(26)
(27)
dcov[U'('ir),r] 
B y
Kp -  P-p)G -  (r -  |x)K -
(w -  n J L ] t r ( i r )  + -  x ^  
0 7  k
k(p,w|r)dpdw,
(32)
dct>v[E/(TT),p] = f j
By 1 » I(P -  HOG -  (r -  |xr)K -
/ M nrr", x U '(T T )
(W  -  |X ) L ] [ /  (TT) +  —  X —
By e .
e(r,w|p)drdw.
(33)
The covariance terms’ sign in (31)—(33), and the 
subsequent comparative statics results of a mean 
preserving spread in the output and input price den­
sity functions in (29) and (30), are determined by 
the firm ’s attitude toward risk, i.e., the sign of 
U"(ir), and the interrelationship among markets,
andj!^. The firm’s attitude toward risk is
necessary but not sufficient to have determinate 
comparative statics results in (29) and (30).
de,
d 7
(28)
Differentiating the first-order conditions in (2) and 
(3), evaluated at 0 = 0 and 7  = 1 , and using 
(26)-(28) yields
^  dK _ 
2 KKd 7  + Q
dL 1 \dcov[U'(Tr) 
•vlr L Am
,r ] -
KLd7  ’I'-  By
BcovIUXtt)^]
2 ,
dK
^ 7
By
Q ^  —  f  " d 7  W 1
Qv
dcovli/'tTrXw] 
By
(29)
IV. Concluding Comments
The literature on the behavior of a firm under 
uncertainty has generally overlooked the interde­
pendencies among output and factor markets. 
Under the special case that markets are indepen 
dent, the firm ’s attitude toward risk is sufficient for 
deriving the long-run equilibrium conditions. It is 
important to incorporate the interrelationship 
among markets in examining the firm ’s behavior 
under uncertainty. In this paper, a general model of 
the firm’s behavior under output and factor price 
uncertainty is developed to evaluate the role of mar­
ket interdependencies in analyzing the long-run 
equilibrium conditions.
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The results show that additional assumptions are 
necessary to derive the firm’s long-run equilibrium 
under uncertainty. Market interdependencies play a 
central role in determining the firm’s long-run equi­
librium rendering previous results, described in the 
literature, as special cases of conditions reported 
here. Our findings also demonstrate that the firm’s 
attitude toward risk is necessary but not sufficient to 
obtain a long-run competitive equilibrium.
Notes
1. However, the analysis in Booth [ 1983 ] assumes 
that the output price and input prices are all 
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. 
Complete independence and perfect correlation 
among output and input prices are special cases 
in his treatment.
2. The assumption that firms are risk averse needs 
further explanation. Since the firm ’s profit is 
the only argument included in the profit func­
tion, the owners may prefer that managers 
exchange profit for less risk. If the firm’s own­
ers hold a diversified portfolio of assets rather 
than just this one firm, then they want their 
managers to be risk neutral and to maximize 
the firm ’s expected utility of profit. In other 
words, departure from the assumption of risk 
aversion is a real possibility. The recent trend in 
human resource management is toward perfor­
mance-based compensation, and prolification 
of stock options as part of the compensation 
package [Abowd and Bognano, 1994]. Koretz 
[1995] finds that, among a group of surveyed 
firms, performance of the firm was positively 
correlated with the degree of CEO ownership. 
This is not surprising as one of the goals of per­
formance-based compensation is to deal with 
agency problems that existed. Jensen and 
Meckling [1976] define owners as principals 
and the manager as owners’ agent. If the man­
ager is a utility-maximizing individual, and his 
personal utility function is influenced by vari­
ables other than the owners,’ then the manager 
may not always act in the best interest of the 
principals. However, in cases that the manag­
er’s utility function is affected by the firm's 
profits, as is the case when compensation is 
performance-based, then the utility functions of 
the managers and the principals tend to coin­
Vol. 43, No. 2 (Fall 1999)
cide, at least as far as the firm-related decisions 
are involved. Therefore, it is safe to assume that 
firm’s managers behave similar to the firm’s 
owners and may become risk averse in their 
decisions. How'ever, assuming that the firm’s 
owners hold a diversified portfolio of assets, 
managers, as well as owners, may become risk 
neutral or risk takers. Assuming this scenario, 
curvature of the utility function may be altered 
so as to allow for the possibility that £/"(tt) = 0  
for risk neutrality or U"(ir) > 0 for risk loving. 
The results for risk neutrality case are present­
ed in the Appendix.
3. The sufficient second-order conditions for the
. . , d2E[U( it )]  „ maximum are that ri = ----- -^=7 —^ < 0 ,K (7 J\-
, d2E[U(tt)] _ , , , , , „
h‘ I = ---- < ° ’ and hKKhn -  Kl. > 0­
4 In deriving (7) from (6 ), the result that 
/ /  k(p,w|r)dpdw = 1 is used.
pw
5. The assumption that output and input price dis­
tributions are independent could roughly be 
interpreted as prices of inputs and outputs 
being independently determined. The general 
equilibrium model of markets shows that input 
and output prices are determined within the 
market mechanism. For example, with deregu­
lated markets and rapid transmission of infor­
mation, transportation costs almost instanta­
neously adjust to the possible price volatility in 
the crude oil market, affecting all sectors of the 
economy. Therefore, relaxing the mutually 
independence of price distribution assumption 
leads to a more realistic model that fits today’s 
real-world economy.
6 . In other words, market interdependencies 
amount to having non-zero partial derivative of 
the conditional densities of output and input 
prices with respect to a given price. The condi­
.. dk(p,w|r) , „ df(p,r|w) , „ , tions — v -  1 #  0 , — 1 ¥= 0 , and
- i I \
— dp ^  0  imply an increase or decrease in
uncertainty to the firm associated with a price
change. For example, dk(p^w|r) > q an(j
> 0 imply an increase in uncertainty of
capital and labor markets to the firm as a result 
of a rise in capital and labor prices, respective-
63
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ly. On the other hand, o implies a
decrease in uncertainty of product market to the 
firm for an increase in output price.
7. We thank an anonymous referee for raising the 
issues and suggesting the references [Hadar 
and Seo, 1990 and Hadar and Russell, 1974] 
that motivated us to write this section.
Appendix A
In this appendix, the competitive firm ’s behavior 
under total price uncertainty when its managers are 
risk neutral is examined. With risk neutrality, i.e., 
{ /'(tt) = 0 , equations ( 1 0 )—( 1 2 ) in the paper become
sign[cov[{/('7r),r]] =  s i g n [ ^ x  ( Al )
sign[cov[tr(iT),w]] -  s i g n ^ x  ^ - }], (A2) 
sign[cov[f/(iT),p]] = s ig n [^ x  (A3)
Following the general model of interdependent 
markets, the covariance terms in (A l)—(A3) are not 
equal to zero under risk neutrality and their sign is 
determined by the interrelationship among markets. 
Now, the firm’s equilibrium under risk neutrality is 
solely established by market interdependencies. 
Using equations (2) and (3), the firm’s equilibrium 
under risk neutrality and market interdependencies 
is
MvGk -  ^  0, (A4)
M-pO,. -  Mv =£ 0. (A5)
Equations (A4) and (A5) under risk neutrality 
and market independencies become
|A e K -  M, = o, (A6)
H-p2, -  Hv = o. (A7)
Let the optimum capital and labor levels 
employed by the firm in (A 4)-(A 5) and in 
(A6)-(A7) be (Kc, Lc) and (KD, L"), respectively. 
Clearly, once market interdependencies are taken 
into consideration, K c K u and L c =£ Lu Whether 
the input levels in (A4) and (A5) are greater than or
64
less than the input levels in (A6 ) and (A7) depends 
on interdependencies among output and factor mar­
kets that determine the sign of covariance terms in 
(Al)  to (A3) and the resulting equilibrium in (A5) 
and (A6 ). The analysis is similar to the results dis­
cussed for a risk averse firm in Section III of the 
paper.
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